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I. INTRODUCTION
Free and open source software (FOSS) is a big deal.' FOSS has be-
come an undeniably important element for businesses and the global
economy in general, as companies increasingly use it internally and at-
tempt to monetize it.2 Governments have even gotten into the act, as a
recent study notes that FOSS plays a critical role in the US Department
of Defense's systems.3 Others have pushed for the adoption of FOSS to
help third-world countries develop.4 Given many of its technological and
developmental advantages, FOSS's use, adoption, and development are
only projected to grow.'
The GNU General Public License (GPL), created by the Free Soft-
ware Foundation (FSF) to govern the use of many FOSS projects, is also
a big deal. 6 Though the dispersed development of FOSS makes calculat-
ing the percentage of FOSS projects licensed under GPL difficult, some
accounts suggest that the percentage is quite high. 7 It is certainly the
1. The term FOSS will be used throughout this Article. The term refers to both free
software and open source software, which are usually the same thing. See infra Part II.C.
FOSS is software whose license, at a minimum, requires that subsequent users have access to
the software's source code free of charge once the software is distributed, and also have the
ability to modify, use, and distribute the software free of charge. As there are over fifty differ-
ent FOSS licenses, it is difficult in one footnote to summarize all the licensing terms that may
attach to a particular FOSS project. For introductory information on FOSS in general and on
specific topic areas, see UNDP-APDIP International Open Source Network, FOSS Primers,
http://www.iosn.net/foss-primers (last visited Mar. 2, 2008).
2. Red Hat, for instance, is just one example of a multi-million dollar company that
generates its revenues by selling FOSS and related services. See redhat.com, Why Subscrip-
tions?, http://www.redhat.com/about/whysubscriptions/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). See also
Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Google Opens Up About Open Source, EWEEK.COM, Oct. 26,
2005, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/Google-Opens-Up-About-Open-
Source/ (discussing Google's increasing reliance on FOSS, both internally and in its consumer
products).
3. See generally The Mitre Corporation, Use of Free and Open Source
Software (FOSS) in the U.S. Department of Defense, version 1.2.04 (2003), http://
www.microcross.com/dodfoss.pdf.
4. Katim S. Touray, Promoting the Adoption and Use of FOSS in Developing Coun-
tries, LINUX.COM, Mar. 25, 2004, http://www.linux.com/articles/35077.
5. See, e.g., Luc Hatlestad, LinuxWorld Showcases Open-Source Growth,
Expansion, INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/
showArticle.jhtml;?articleID= 168600351.
6. • For a copy of the GPL, see Free Software Foundation, The GNU General Public
License, http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
7. Press Release, Free Software Foundation, FSF Releases Guidelines for Revising the
GPL, Nov. 30, 2005, http://gplv3.fsf.org/press/press2005ll30.html (indicating that GPL gov-
erns 75% of all FOSS projects); see, e.g., freshmeat.net: Statistics and Top 20, http://
freshmeat.net/stats/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2008) (showing approximately 64% of FOSS licenses
governed by GPL). Compare SourceForge.net: Software Map, http://sourceforge.netl
softwaremap/trove-list.php?formcat=14 (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (listing all licensed FOSS
projects at SourceForge), with SourceForge.net: Software Map, http://sourceforge.netl
softwaremap/trove-Iist.php?formscat=15 (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (listing GNU GPL pro-
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most well-known and most frequently used FOSS license. 8 Like FOSS,
the GPL is here to stay.
But in what form? The FSF created the most popular version of the
GPL, GPL Version 2.0 (GPLv2), in 1991, but since then many techno-
logical changes have occurred that, according to the FSF, have rendered
GPLv2 outdated.9 Consequently, the FSF recently underwent a process
to revise GPLv2. Version 3 of the GPL (GPLv3), published on June 29,
2007, is the final product of that process.'0
GPLv3 contemplates a number of important changes, including in-
ternationalizing the license by eliminating terminology generally
associated with US copyright law and adding new language that makes
GPLv3 more compatible with other FOSS licenses." Two of the most
important new provisions, however, address Digital Rights Management
(DRM) and software patents. In essence, the DRM provisions effectively
make using DRM with GPLv3-licensed software almost legally impos-
sible, unless the user also has the ability to unlock the DRM (which in
many cases negates the DRM's purpose in the first place). Furthermore,
the new patent provisions prevent patent holders who convey (a term
newly defined in GPLv3) GPLv3-licensed works from suing and assert-
ing their patent rights against third parties for rights exercised under
GPLv3.
What effect will these changes have? Although responses have been
varied, two camps within the FOSS world have emerged to articulate
their stances on GPLv3. These two camps are the same two groups that
have been at odds over FOSS development since at least 1998: the Free
Software Foundation (FSF) on the one hand, and those more closely
aligned with the Open Source Initiative's (OSI) approach to FOSS de-
velopment on the other. The FSF maintains an almost religious
adherence to certain ethical tenets of free software doctrine, while OSI
adherents are more "pragmatic" about their approach to FOSS develop-
ment. GPLv3, and especially the DRM and patent provisions, highlights
some of these two groups' differences in philosophy. Some also fret that
GPLv3 may ultimately foreshadow the dissolution of their uneasy com-
promise. 2
jects only) (showing as of April 8, 2008, that 69% of all FOSS projects on SourceForge.net are
licensed under the GPL).
8. Id.
9. Free Software Foundation, supra note 7.
10. Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License Version 3, June 29, 2007,
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.html [hereinafter GPLv3].
I1. See Press Release, Free Software Foundation, FSF Releases the GNU General Pub-
lic License, Version 3, June 29, 2007, http://www.fsf.org/news/gplv3_launched.
12. Jonathan Zuck, Which Way, Open-Sourcers?, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 12, 2006,
http://www.news.com2010-7344_3-6114507.html.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Section II details the philosophical
differences between the FSF and OSI and what these differences have
meant to FOSS licensing, and FOSS development in general, until now.
Section III details the DRM and patent changes provided in GPLv3 and
discusses both sides' reactions to those changes. It then examines what
these GPLv3 changes, and the reactions from both parties, could mean
for FOSS licensing and development in the future. Section IV concludes
by recapping some of the main findings of this study.
This Article's thesis is that the two parties' differences pale in com-
parison to their commonalities, and that GPLv3, despite its possible
problem areas, will be an effective means for dealing with two growing
problems that threaten the FOSS world. GPvL3 may add new social and
legal complications to FOSS development, but, as with GPLv2, GPLv3's
unifying potential is greater than its possible "balkanizing" effects. In the
end, GPLv3 is a calculated risk worth taking.
II. FREE SOFTWARE V. OPEN SOURCE
A. The FSF's Vision of Free Software
The OSI and FSF started off as the same camp but, as the FSF notes
on its website, in 1998 some members of the free software movement
began using the term "open source" instead of "free software" to de-
scribe the movement.13 That term, according to the FSF, soon "became
associated with a different approach, a different philosophy, different
values, and even a different criterion for which licenses are acceptable.' 4
The FSF thus describes the two camps as "separate movements with dif-
ferent views and goals ... like two political camps within the free
software community."'
5
What are the FSF's main ideological tenets? For the FSF, whether
software should be "free" is an ethical question, not a practical problem;
the group states that "non-free software is a social problem and free
software is the solution.' 16
As the FSF defines it, free software is "a matter of liberty, not
price.""7 To more clearly understand this distinction, the FSF urges con-
13. Richard M. Stallman, Why "Free Software" Is Better Than "Open Source", in FREE
SOFTWARE, FREE SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 57, 57 (Joshua Gay




17. Free Software Foundation, The Free Software Definition, http://www.fsf.org/
licensing/essays/free-sw.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
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sumers to "think of 'free' in terms of 'free speech,' not 'free beer.""' Us-
ers of free software should enjoy four specific freedoms; otherwise the
software is not "free." These freedoms are:
* The freedom to run the program, for any purpose (freedom
0).
* The freedom to study how the program works, and adapt it
to your needs (freedom 1). Access to the source code is a
precondition for this.
" The freedom to redistribute copies so you can help your
neighbor (freedom 2).
" The freedom to improve the program, and release your im-
provements to the public ... (freedom 3). Access to the
source code is a precondition for this.' 9
Copyleft is also an important proviso of most free software (al-
though not an absolute requirement), including and especially for
GPLv2-licensed FOSS. Copyleft means that all redistributions of works
based upon the software must be licensed under the same license terms
under which they were originally received. 20 Hence, if a user receives a
GPLv2'ed work, modifies it, and then distributes the modified work, she
must do so under GPLv2's terms. Although the FSF notes that non-
copylefted free software also exists, most free software, as the FSF de-
fines it, is licensed under GPLv2 and is thus copylefted."
However, free software does not mean "non-commercial." Persons
distributing free software can charge a fee for such distribution, although
they cannot charge license royalties for redistribution following the ini-
tial distribution (which would deny users the freedom to redistribute
copies). 22
But while the FSF recognizes the possibilities and importance of
free software's commercialization in some cases,23 its essential focus
remains on ensuring the software's freedoms, as defined above. Hence,
the FSF refuses to cater to businesses' unease with the FSF's mission by
restricting the freedoms in any way, or by calling the movement anything
other than "free software": "[T]alking about freedom, about ethical is-
sues, about responsibilities as well as convenience, is asking people to
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Free Software Foundation, What is Copyleft?, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/
copyleft.htmi (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
21. Id.
22. Free Software Foundation, supra note 17.
23. Id.
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think about things they might rather ignore. This can trigger discomfort
.... It does not follow that society would be better off [if the FSF
stopped stressing freedom]. '4 The FSF believes that users must learn to
value the freedom free software provides "for its own sake," rather than
"talking only about the immediate practical benefits of certain free soft-
ware ... .,,2 Becoming "more acceptable to business" and "keep[ing]
quiet" about software freedom in order to cater to businesses are not the
FSF's goals; instead, cultivating and entrenching a new set of free soft-
ware ethics are its primary objectives.26
B. The OSI's Vision. A Different Movement?
The OSI's philosophy of software development has earned a variety
of labels: pragmatic, practical, and business friendly are some of the
more positive denominations. Alternatively, caving to business, fear of
freedom, and keeping quiet about freedom are some of the more pejora-
tive accusations the FSF has leveled against the OSI's approach.28
As noted above, the OSI officially began in 1998 when some mem-
bers of the FSF camp "realized it was time to dump the confrontational
attitude that has been associated with 'free software' in the past and sell
the idea strictly on ... pragmatic, business-case grounds. 29 Conse-
quently, the OSI adopted the term "open source software" to replace the
increasingly confrontational "free software" label. Contrary to the FSF's
approach, the OSI seeks compromise with the commercial software
community, believing that business support and involvement are vital to
the FOSS movement's ultimate success.0 As the OSI explains its posi-
tion:
The Open Source Initiative is a marketing program for free
software. It's a pitch for 'free software' because it works, not be-
cause it's the only right thing to do. We're selling freedom on its
merits .... Many users learn to appreciate freedom through
their own experience, rather than being told about it.3
24. Stallman, supra note 13, at 59.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Open Source Initiative, History of the OSI, http://www.opensource.org/history
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (listing a number of these terms).
28. Stallman, supra note 13, at 59.
29. See Open Source Initiative, supra note 27.
30. KENNETH WONG & PHET SAYO, FREE/OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE: A GENERAL
INTRODUCTION 7, (UNDP-APDIP 2004), available at http://www.apdip.net/publications/
fossepri mers/foss-intro-nocover.pdf.
31. Open Source Initiative, Frequently Asked Questions, http://opensource.linux-
mirror.org/advocacy/faq.php (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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For software licensing, this means the OSI also provides a definition
(the OSD) of what constitutes open source software. Despite the group's
name, the OSI makes clear that open source software does not "just
mean access to the source code. 32 Instead, for software to be open
source and for the software license to be OSI-certified, the software's
distribution terms must comply with the following ten conditions: 1) the
license must allow for free distribution of the software, 2) the software's
source code must be available and distributable, 3) "[t]he license must
allow modifications and derived works," 4) users must maintain the in-
tegrity of the author's source by allowing for modified versions to be
distinguished from the original source code, 5) the license may not dis-
criminate against persons or groups, 6) the license may not discriminate
against specific fields of endeavor, 7) the license rights of the program
"must apply to all to whom the program is redistributed without need for
... an additional license," 8) the "license must not be specific to a [par-
ticular] product," 9) "the license must not restrict other software," and
10) "the license must be technology-neutral. 33 Software licenses that
meet these conditions can earn OSI certification.
C. Practical Differences?
What have been the practical differences in FOSS development and
licensing resulting from these two different philosophical approaches
and licensing schemes? In reality, not many. As the FSF notes, "[t]he
Open Source Definition is clear enough, and it is quite clear that the
typical non-free program does not qualify [under it]."3 The FSF further
states, "[tihe official definition of 'open source software' ... is very
close to [the FSF's] definition of free software," although the FSF does
note that the OSI's definition "is a little looser in some respects, and [the
OSI has] accepted a few licenses that [the FSF considers] unacceptably
restrictive of the users."35 Although close, the definitions are "not identi-
cal. 36
Nonetheless, as other commentators have noted, "the software, the
technology, the developers, and even the licenses are essentially the
same. The only thing that differs is the attitude and the propaganda."
37
Indeed, rather than to propose a radical new set of terms to govern FOSS
32. Open Source Initiative, The Open Source Definition (Annotated), Version 1.9,
http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php, (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
33. Id.
34. Stallman, supra note 13, at 60.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Free Software Foundation, supra note 17.
37. Adam Engel, Free as in Freedom-Part Two: New Linux, PRESS ACTION, Dec. 12,
2004, http://www.pressaction.com/news/weblog/full-article/engel 12122004.
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development, the OSI created the OSD in contrast to the FSF's definition
largely as a means to clarify a few issues and rhetorically emphasize a
different ideological bent. To expect major differences in licensing terms
is thus unwarranted.
Although the OSI definition has ten conditions for OSI certification
compared to the FSF's four freedoms for free software, much overlap
exists between the two definitions. The FSF's freedom 2 (freedom to
redistribute) covers condition 1 of the OSI's definition. Condition 2 of
the OSI's definition, access to source code, is a precondition for two of
the FSF's freedoms. Freedom 3 of the FSF's definition (freedom to im-
prove the program and release to public) is essentially equivalent to
condition 3 of the OSI's definition. Condition 4 in the OSI's definition
relating to protecting authors' integrity, while not explicitly delineated as
one of the FSF's freedoms, is explicitly allowed for in the FSF's defini-
tion document if such a condition does not substantively block users'
38freedom to release modified versions .
And while the FSF does not explicitly discuss the OSI's conditions 5
and 6 (no discrimination against persons or groups or against fields of
endeavor), such conditions seem implicit in the FSF's very definition of
freedom. Other conditions of the OSI definition, including 7, 8, and 9,
have proven to be of little practical importance in terms of licensing and
FOSS development.39 Condition 10 of the OSD, requiring that the license
be technology-neutral, has also spawned little controversy until now.
Indeed, the similarities between the two camps further manifest
themselves in terms of the licenses both groups approve. Both groups'
websites provide lists of approved licenses; the FSF further provides a
list of specifically disapproved licenses that do not qualify as free soft-
ware. Only three of the FSF's disapproved licenses appear in the OSI's
list of approved licenses: the Original Artistic License, the Apple Public
Source License v. 1.2, and the Reciprocal Public License.4 0 Hence, while
all free software qualifies as open source software and not vice-versa,
38. Free Software Foundation, supra note 17.
39. LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (Noreen Regina ed., 2004), available at http://www.rosenlaw.coml
RosenChO I.pdf.
40. The FSF disapproves of the Original Artistic License because it is too vague, and
therefore provides some leeway for developers to restrict users' freedom. It disapproves of
v. 1.2 of the Apple Public Source License because any modified version of the software "de-
ployed" within an organization must be published, which restricts the user's freedom to
privately use the software. The FSF disapproves of the Reciprocal Public License because
"I) [iut puts limits on prices charged for an initial copy[,] 2) [i]t requires notification of the
original developer for publication of a modified version[, and] 3) [it requires publication of
any modified version that an organization uses, even privately." Free Software Foundation,
Licenses and Comments, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/index-html (last visited Mar. 3,
2008).
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only three open source licenses with OSI approval do not also qualify as
free software.
Furthermore, though these three licenses may highlight some minor
differences between the two groups, they remain minority licenses; both
groups approve of the more important software licenses, such as the
Berkeley Software Distribution license (BSD), increasingly the Mozilla
Public License (MPL), and, importantly, GPLv2. The GPL is by far the
most important and widely used FOSS license in the world, and both
camps heavily rely on it and work together on projects governed by its
terms. Both groups also approve of more updated versions of two of the
three FSF-disfavored licenses that have removed the restrictive clauses
the previous versions contained. Despite their philosophical differences
then, until now the two groups approve of and rely on primarily the same
set of software licenses to support their movements.
Thus, as the former top lawyer for the FSF, Eben Moglen, notes, the
main differences between the two groups remain ideological: adherents
of the FSF are committed to a more communitarian approach to software
development, whereas the OSI ideology remains more libertarian in na-
ture. 4' The practical differences in outcome, however, have been
negligible.
Will this ideological rift remain benign? Moglen and the FSF believe
so:
So is the dialog between "open source" and "free software" a
threat to free software's future? Not at all. The free software idea
is irreversibly embedded in the fabric of the Internet Society. As
it grows larger, the movement behind that idea will go through
many transformations, and its meaning will remain contested.
But those of us who are committed to its success don't all have
to be pushing in exactly the same direction in order to help it
along. Whatever the names we use, we know what we're talking
about, and we know why Free Software matters.42
The differences between the two groups thus seemingly lie in se-
mantics. But with GPLv3, these semantics have proven more important
than in previous squabbles. More than any encounter yet, GPLv3 gener-
ally highlights the two groups' differences and embodies, in licensing
terms, several of those differences. GPLv3 represents a possible break-
ing point for these two camps' uneasy compromise. What this may mean
for FOSS development is the next Section's topic.
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III. GPLv3: ITS TERMS
GPLv2 had been in use, without revision, since 1991. In mid-2005,
Richard Stallman and the FSF announced that they would revise GPLv2
and create GPLv3 to address a myriad of technological changes that had
engulfed the computing and software communities in the intervening
years.4 '3 The FSF later began a one-year revision process in which it pro-
duced several drafts of GPLv3 and conducted worldwide conferences to
solicit feedback on those drafts. Given the GPL's significance, participa-
tion across the globe was intense.
GPLv3 is the final product of that process. Released June 29th,
2007, GPLv3 includes a number of new sections as well as significant
changes to preexisting ones. Among the changes, GPLv3 includes new
definitions that more effectively "internationalize" the license by replac-
ing terms typically associated with US copyright law with more neutral
terms, a new section for "Additional Terms" that allows the copyright
holder to attach certain additional permissions to GPLv3'ed software,
explicit recognition of "fair use" or the equivalent provided by copyright
law, a new section that explains GPLv3's use with the GNU Affero Gen-
eral Public License, a revised method for terminating the GPLv3 license,
and new language governing source code licenses in merger and acquisi-
tion transactions."
Not coincidentally, however, two of the most significant and hotly
contested changes in GPLv3 happen to be provisions that touch upon
some of the core differences between the FSF and the OSI vision of
FOSS development: a new section 3 titled "Protecting Users' Legal
Rights From Anti-Circumvention Law" ("Anti-DRM Section") and new
patent provisions, including a new Section 11 titled "Patents" ("Patent
Section") and Section 10's automatic patent licensing of "Downstream
Recipients." This Article now examines these provisions, the FSF, the
OSI, and other major players' reactions to them, and their likely social
and legal results for FOSS development.
A. GPLv3's Anti-DRM Section
1. Its Contents
From its small size, GPLv3's new section 3 might seem rather be-
nign. In its brevity, however, the section's sweeping language imposes
significant requirements upon FOSS developers using GPLv3'ed FOSS.
43. Free Software Foundation, supra note 7.
44. For a copy of GPLv3 and these new terms, see Free Software Foundation, Welcome
to GPLv3, http://gplv3.fsf.org/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
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Indeed, of all the changes GPLv3 introduces, the Anti-DRM Section has
spawned some of the most intense controversy during the process lead-
ing up to GPLv3's adoption.
Section 3 starts by explicitly addressing "para-copyright ' 45 measures
adopted throughout the world. It states: "No covered work [under
GPLv3] shall be deemed part of an effective technological measure un-
der any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article II of the
WIPO copyright treaty46 ... or similar laws prohibiting or restricting
circumvention of such measures. 47 With one fell swoop, GPLv3 declares
GPLv3'ed works outside the coverage of para-copyright measures
worldwide, adopted pursuant to the WIPO Copyright Treaty or other-
wise.
Section 3's next paragraph broadens GPLvD's assault on para-
copyright measures by imposing disclaimers on conveyers of GPLv3'ed
works. Under GPLv3, conveying parties expressly waive the power to
forbid circumvention if the user needs to do so in order to enjoy
GPLv3's freedoms. Conveying parties also disclaim any intention to
limit the design or use of a covered work in order to enforce any legal
rights arising under anti-circumvention law.48
GPLv3 also includes language in other sections aimed at combating
the purported vices of DRM. Section 1 includes a definition of "Corre-
sponding Source" to ensure that when persons or entities convey
GPLv3'ed works, the source code necessary to generate, install, operate,
and modify the software is also available. 9 Section 6, "Conveying Non-
Source Forms," adds to this requirement by ensuring that users can use
modified versions of GPLv3'ed software on devices specifically designed
to prevent such use of modified forms (e.g., TiVo). For instance, the sec-
tion includes definitions for "User Product" and "Installation
Information," and essentially requires that for any such products (i.e., con-
sumer products or anything designed to be used in homes), any encryption
45. "Para-copyright" is often used to mean technological measures granted to copyright
holders that actually extend their rights beyond what copyright law has traditionally granted.
See Letter from Wendy Seltzer & Bryan W. Taylor, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, to
David 0. Carson, General Counsel, Copyright CG/I&R, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/
comments/reply/109selzerbcis.pdf (commenting on 64 Fed. Reg. 66139, 66139-41 (Nov. 24,
1999)).
46. Article II of the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright
Treaty requires that all member states provide authors of copyrighted works with the protec-
tion of technical measures to ensure that violation of copyright owners' rights does not occur.
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. II, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocswo033.html.
47. GPLv3, supra note 10, § 3.
48. Id. See also FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, GPLv3 THIRD DISCUSSION DRAFT RA-
TIONALE 14 (2007), available at http://gplv3.fsf.org/gpl3-dd3-rationale.pdf.
49. GPLv3, supra note 10, § i.
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keys or other information necessary to operate modified GPLv3'ed soft-
ware on such products (i.e., the Installation Information) must be
provided as part of the Corresponding Source."
2. FSF's Position on DRM
As the GPLv3's author, Richard Stallman and the FSF strongly be-
lieve that these anti-DRM provisions are absolutely crucial to ensure free
software's continuing vitality and to thwart the growing threat of "para-
copyright."5 ' Otherwise, as Stallman argues, the increasing "Tivoization"
of free software, as well as "treacherous computing," could increasingly
erode free software's freedoms. 2
"Tivoization" describes what TiVo has done with GPL'ed software
used in conjunction with its popular digital video recorder (DVR): utiliz-
ing GPLv2 licensed software, but then including digital keys in the
software and hardware to restrict how users can use modified versions of
that software. The software is under the GPL so users have access and
the ability to modify TiVo's source code, but the modified version of the
software will not work properly on the TiVo hardware because once a
user modifies the source code, the digital key included in the software
will not match the digital key in the hardware.53 The use of DRM in this
manner applies not only to TiVo, but potentially to many other software
programs licensed under the GPL as well. Indeed, the FSF notes on its
website that increasingly more embedded device manufacturers are lock-
ing down their devices in this way, ranging from wireless routers to
personal media players.
"Treacherous computing" is similar. In such scenarios, computers
are equipped with encryption keys that communicate with and verify the
software applications, as well as websites, interacting with the com-
puter.5  The software or hardware will not allow unauthorized
applications or programs to interact with them. Altering the software or
50. Id. § 6.
51. See Free Software Foundation, Opinion on Digital Restrictions Management 1,
http://gplv3.fsf.org/drm-dd2.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2008) (calling DRM a para-copyright
system of "technical means to turn the system of copyright law, where the powers of the copy-
right holder are limited exceptions to general freedom, into a prison, where everything not
specifically permitted is utterly forbidden, and ... technically impossible").
52. Free Software Foundation Europe, Transcript of Richard Stallman at the 5th Inter-
national GPLv3 Conference (Nov. 21, 2006), http:/lwww.fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/tokyo-
rms-transcript.en.html.
53. Shashank Sharma, Stallman, Torvalds, Moglen Share Views on DRM and GPLv3,
Aug. 9, 2006, LINUx.coM, http://www.linux.com/articles/56171.
54. Free Software Foundation, It's Not Just TIVO Locking Down Their Hardware,
http://www.fsf.org/blogslicensing/gplv3-lockdown (Oct. 11, 2006).
55. See Ross Anderson, 'Trusted Computing' Frequently Asked Questions, Version 1.1
(Aug. 2003), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rja 14/tcpa-faq.html.
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hardware in any manner, therefore, would potentially prevent users from
using the computer or programs; FOSS programs could be entirely
blocked if not authorized by the hardware, software, or operating system.
According to Stallman and the FSF, such restrictions on a user's
freedoms have "no legitimate social purpose. '56 Such technical restric-
tions that allow third parties to control users' ability to modify and run a
GPL'ed work make the FSF's freedom 1 a sham. Hence, while the soft-
ware may technically comply with the letter of GPLv2, Tivo and other
similar programs completely evade the GPL's spirit.
7
GPLv3 addresses this problem by requiring access to the digital keys
(i.e., Installation Information) when necessary to run the modified ver-
sions on User Products. As Stallman indicated at a June 2006 conference
in Barcelona, "[t]hey must give you whatever it takes to authorize your
version so that it will run."58 According to the FSF, however, GPLv3 does
not prohibit developers and programmers from implementing DRM; in-
stead, the new license simply "prevents [DRM features] from being
imposed on users in a way that they cannot remove."' 9 If a manufacturer
elects to nullify warranties and service support for modified versions of
the software, doing so is perfectly legitimate under GPLv3, according to
the FSF's former top lawyer.6°
3. The Other Side of the Coin? OSI Sympathizers
Although the OSI has not issued a specific position on GPLv3 or its
provisions, many of those who share its development philosophy have
voiced their opinions. For instance, Linus Torvalds, the Linux kernel's
original creator and a general supporter of the OSI's approach to FOSS,
was one of GPLv3's most outspoken critics during the revision process,
though his initial stance has softened. 6' He remains particularly con-
cerned, however, with GPLv3's anti-DRM section, citing it as a clear
example of a choice being made on the "religious" tenets of the FSF
rather than the appropriate technical grounds.62
Torvalds and others see the DRM provision as a clear encroachment
into the hardware manufacturer's prerogatives because the provision seeks
56. Free Software Foundation, supra note 5 1, at 1-2.
57. Id.
58. Sharna, supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Stephen Shankland, Torvalds 'Pretty Pleased' about new GPL 3 Draft, CNET
NEWS.COM, Mar. 28, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301 -10784-3-6171300-7.html.
62. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Is GPL 3 Dead on Arrival?, LINUX-WATCH, Aug, 3,
2006, http://www.linux-watch.com/news/NS7031382827.html.
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to control the hardware through the software's licensing provisions.63 He
sees as legitimate, for instance, a hardware manufacturer's desire to re-
strict use of hardware to one version of GPL'ed software, since that may
be the only version that the hardware manufacturer has tested and vali-
dated for use with the hardware. 64 This concern may be particularly
relevant when government regulators approve a specific version of FOSS
for medical devices, cell phones, or other devices, and would like to use
DRM to prohibit untested versions, or where privacy protection is of ut-
most concern. Others concur, claiming that GPLv3 appears to "extend
control to the systems the software is run on," which would be a signifi-
cant encroachment of a manufacturer and others' rights. 6 Partially
because of such objections, Torvalds has indicated that he is unsure
whether the Linux kernel will be re-licensed under GPLv3.67
Furthermore, companies such as TiVo are sometimes required by
third parties to implement DRM in order to legally display certain types
of content on their devices. HBO, for instance, requires TiVo to imple-
ment DRM as a condition for allowing TiVo to display HBO's
copyrighted content.6 Arguably, the FSF should not be able to thwart
protections the US Congress has granted copyright holders; lobbying for
corrective legislative action may be the more legitimate route.
Of course, this somewhat cynical view of the FSF's motives may not
be entirely fair. While accusations against the FSF and its desire for ab-
solute control may contain some truth, DRM does in fact limit free
software's freedoms and thwart technological innovation in a very real
way. Hence, the FSF's position may be less about control for control's
sake, but rather control as a means to protect freedoms the group consid-
ers important and that are important to FOSS's continued success. If one
cynical view is that the FSF is attempting to simply control both the
hardware and the software through the DRM section, another is that de-
velopers have and will increasingly use hardware platforms to evade the
GPL's requirements. Without GPLv3's DRM solution, FOSS could in-
creasingly look and feel like proprietary software.
63. Stephen Shankland, Torvalds Critical of New GPL Draft, CNET NEWS.COM, July
28, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-6099475.html.
64. Id.
65. Zuck, supra note 12.
66. Stephen Shankland, New GPL Draft Takes Second Crack at DRM, CNET
NEWS.COM, July 27, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-6099236.html.
67. Shankland, supra note 61.
68. Jeremy Reimer, GPL 3 Disses DRM, ARS TECHNICA, Jan. 1, 2006, http:II
arstechnica.connews.ars/post/20060120-6024.html.
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4. Who is Right? Anti-DRM Section's
Possible Stymieing Effects
Both sides present some plausible arguments. From the anti-GPLv3
perspective, the Anti-DRM Section could stifle corporate sponsorship of
FOSS, particularly that which is licensed under GPLv3. This lack of
corporate sponsorship, in turn, could slow the FOSS movement and hin-
der the realization of many of the FOSS movement's perceived benefits,
such as greater technological innovation and collaboration. Thus, the
FSF's desire to enable technological innovation through GPLv3's anti-
DRM terms may ultimately limit it by stymieing corporate input.
Indeed, much of the existing corporate unease with GPLv2 stems
from copyleft and its "viral" nature, and arguably GPLv3's anti-DRM
section increases the software's viral proclivity, i.e., GPLv3'ed software
not only "infects" other software, but has the potential to infect the
hardware upon which it runs and third-party copyrighted content, too.
The corporate world's solution may be to shun GPLv3 in particular, and
FOSS altogether, if GPLv3's spreading proclivities begin to infect in-
creasingly more FOSS projects. In some cases, the inability to protect
their IP rights through effective DRM strategies may be enough for some
developers, manufacturers, and third-party copyright holders to go this
route. The possible magnitude of this problem requires answers to two
preliminary issues.
a. Gauging the Importance of Corporate Sponsorship
First, how imperative is corporate sponsorship for FOSS develop-
ment? Independent developers, for instance, can and often do create
FOSS without corporate sponsorship, and could (and most certainly will)
continue to do so under GPLv3. Corporate sponsorship is not always
necessary for a FOSS project's vitality. Developers often have non-
pecuniary motivations related to peer recognition and prestige for creat-
ing FOSS, and these robust communities will certainly not disappear
even if corporate sponsorship of FOSS dwindles.6 9 Hence, even if the
new DRM provisions had the effect of stifling some corporate sponsor-
ship, they certainly would not end the FOSS movement.
Nonetheless, numerous examples show how important corporate
sponsorship has been to the growth and development of various FOSS
projects; thus, stifling corporate sponsorship is a real threat to FOSS
development. IBM, for instance, has contributed vast amounts of resources
to developing Linux, as have Novell, Oracle, and other prominent
69. JOSH LERNER & JEAN TIROLE, THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE 19-22
(2000), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=224008.
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companies." These companies have found strategic reasons to do so, and
have thus helped build up and foster the spread of FOSS use.7'
Other companies, most notably Red Hat, have successfully
monetized FOSS directly (Linux distributions for enterprise environ-
ments in Red Hat's case), and have contributed immense resources to
specific FOSS projects to remain commercially viable. Thus, though it is
impossible to say exactly how various FOSS projects would fare without
corporate sponsorship, it is nearly beyond doubt that these corporate
players have contributed significantly to the projects' development,
growth, and expansion, and that continued commercial support is impor-
tant. Though the various FOSS projects may survive without this
sponsorship, they certainly would not be as robust as they are now (or
will be in the future) without these corporate resources.
b. Gauging the Likelihood of GPLv3's Adoption
Second, the possible stifling effects of the DRM provisions also de-
pend on whether developers widely adopt GPLv3. Software developers,
for instance, could vote with their feet and simply stick with GPLv2 if
GPLv3 and its DRM provisions truly are a bad idea. As mentioned,
Linus Torvalds has already indicated skepticism about GPLv3's merits."
Similarly, many of the corporate sponsors of various FOSS projects can
either keep those projects under GPLv2 if they own them or, if they are
not the copyright owner, use their leverage to convince the copyright
owner to remain with the current FOSS license. Thus, GPLv3 could be
"dead on arrival. 73
The likelihood of GPLv3 quickly becoming obsolete, however, is
doubtful. Indeed, anti-DRM attitudes among developers are quite preva-
lent, and their enthusiasm to "stick it to content owners" may be enough
reason for many developers and projects to go with the GPLv3. Aside
from this purely retaliatory motive, many developers may sincerely de-
sire to develop software that is free from the restrictions that DRM
imposes. The FSF, which is the owner of many important FOSS projects,
has or will re-license all of its projects under GPLv3.74 And like with
GPLv2, GPLv3's copyleft provision will also most certainly ensure that
it gains increasing footing. Consequently, though it is impossible to pre-
70. See Press Release, IBM, IBM Taps Boom in Linux Growth by Expanding Com-
mitment to Partners, Linux and Open Source, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www-03.ibm.com/press/
us/en/pressrelease/19048.wss.
71. Jay Lyman, Consultants Report Corporations Embracing, Saving with Open
Source, LINUX.COM, Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.linux.com/articles/51166.
72. See supra text accompanying note 61.
73. Vaughan-Nichols, supra note 62.
74. See Free Software Foundation, supra note 11.
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dict exactly how many future projects will be licensed under GPLv3 (as
well as how many existing projects will be re-licensed under GPLv3), it
is almost certain that, given these factors, the GPLv3 will enjoy some
amount of support.
c. FOSS Thriving (Surviving) in a Post-GPLv3 World
Despite these factors, arguably GPLv3's anti-DRM provisions will
not be the death knell of corporate participation for a number of reasons.
The anti-DRM provisions will not affect companies using GPLv3'ed
FOSS internally, for instance, since the companies do not convey the
software and thus are not required to share the source code. Large num-
bers of companies fall into this category and contribute large amounts of
resources to FOSS projects in order to have ongoing access to viable
software." Presumably they would continue to do so even if the software
were under GPLv3.
Furthermore, companies that use and take advantage of web-based
GPLv3'ed software services also do not convey the software, and there-
fore are under no requirement to share the source code and Installation
Information to the FOSS under GPLv3. Again, many companies fall into
this category and contribute significant resources to fostering FOSS de-
velopment for their particular needs .
Lastly, other companies that may convey GPLv3'ed software as part
of their business may have no need for encryption keys, and thus these
anti-DRM provisions would have no strong deterrent effect upon them
either. These three categories of companies, in aggregate, cover many
commercial uses of FOSS projects; hence, the DRM provisions may
have little if any effect on a large number of FOSS projects.
Nonetheless, the anti-DRM provisions could have negative conse-
quences for companies that do use DRM as an integral component of
their software/hardware packages and that would like to take advantage
of GPLv3 software. Arguably many such companies will be unwilling to
provide the encryption keys due to security, warranty, and intellectual
property concerns." Of course, as Moglen notes, these companies are
free to waive warranties for altered versions of the software the company
75. Companies from Google to Yahoo rely heavily on FOSS internally as well as for
their web applications. See Vaughan-Nichols, supra note 2 (indicating that Google developers
make use of FOSS, and that Google supports various FOSS projects).
76. For examples of such companies, see http://www.basecamphq.com (last visited Apr.
2, 2008) and http://www.salesforce.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
77. For instance, while the software may be licensed under GPLv3 and thus legiti-
mately restrict the licensee's intellectual property rights in the software, the anti-DRM
provisions may negatively affect the licensee's intellectual property fights in the hardware,
which arguably the license should not be able to do.
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has not certified and tested, although, until the validity of such disclaim-
ers has been litigated, the company may bear some amount of risk in
going this route."
Furthermore, as mentioned above, some third-party copyright hold-
ers require companies that provide access to their copyrighted content to
implement DRM in their devices and software packages as a condition
for legally displaying or using that content. These content owners would
likely be unwilling to allow companies such access without DRM's pro-
tections, and this unwillingness may lead to fewer legal means for
obtaining that content. The DRM provisions may thereby kill beneficial
deals between companies.
Despite these concerns, the option of FOSS project owners to pick
and choose between GPLv2 and GPLv3 depending on the projects'
needs and preferences diminishes the likelihood that GPLv3 will have
the stifling effects to the extent some imagine. Indeed, if Torvalds ulti-
mately decides to stick with GPLv2 for the Linux kernel, this would
mean that embedded device manufacturers could continue to use Linux
with DRM under GPLv2 (as can presumably TiVo). Governments and
other entities with legitimate privacy concerns taking advantage of
GPLv2'ed FOSS can similarly continue to use DRM in their respective
spheres.
While this dual presence of licenses may lead to some amount of li-
cense proliferation, "forking" of FOSS projects, and its attendant
complications and slowing of FOSS collaboration, it is perhaps a more
palatable proliferation given the possible advantages the Anti-DRM Sec-
tion presents. Indeed, legislative action to amend the contentious Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is cumbersome, especially given
that entities such as the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) and Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), with their
deep pockets, would likely dominate the process. GPLv3 represents one
measure that could, with time, push industries away from the draconian
measure that DRM often represents towards solutions that more effec-
tively satisfy both providers and consumers. With time, as more FOSS
projects under GPLv3 are tried out in the commercial context, those with
DRM-like concerns may discover more effective and ideal ways to pro-
tect their interests than with DRM; it is an experiment worth trying. The
Anti-DRM Section may not be the ultimate solution; but it may lead to
one.
In the meantime, companies wishing to use GPLv3'ed FOSS but
also desiring to protect themselves via DRM face three different possi-
bilities. First, companies may opt against using GPLv3'ed software and
78. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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instead be forced to other, perhaps less optimal, software options. This
result may lead to greater inefficiencies in the software and related mar-
kets. Second, such companies may simply use the software without
providing the encryption keys and take the calculated risks that 1) they
will not be sued, 2) courts will declare the anti-DRM provisions invalid
or unenforceable, or 3) the GPLv3 is unenforceable against them. This
approach would almost certainly lead to litigation in some cases, and
may inadvertently help settle certain outstanding legal questions sur-
rounding GPLv3, as discussed below. Lastly, companies may simply
elect to use GPLv3'ed software, comply with GPLv3's terms, and issue
disclaimers for altered versions. As mentioned above, this may ulti-
mately push companies toward new, more palatable solutions to protect
themselves as well as consumers, but it could also result in litigation sur-
rounding the validity of their issued disclaimers.
d. Conclusion
GPLv3's anti-DRM provisions will thus likely have mixed effects on
FOSS development. Despite the uproar during the GPLv3 revision proc-
ess, the DRM provisions will likely not have significant effects for a
large number of FOSS projects because the relevant companies do not
convey the software as part of their commercial activities, and therefore
do not need to provide any relevant Installation Information. Other com-
panies that do convey FOSS have no need for encryption keys, so the
DRM provisions will hardly affect them.
Furthermore, because some projects, notably including the Linux
kernel, can simply elect to remain under the GPLv2's terms, fears of vast
corporate withdrawal from FOSS development seem exaggerated. While
an additional GPL that coexists with GPLv2 is a less than ideal solution
that may cause some increased complexity in FOSS development,7 9
GPLv3's potential for ultimately helping address the DRM quagmire
seems worth the tradeoff.
Conversely, other companies wishing to use GPLv3'ed FOSS as well
as DRM face a more uncertain future. These companies may elect not to
use GPLv3'ed software, and this choice may cause some modest amount
of slowing in FOSS development as well as complicating license prolifera-
tion. If companies elect to use GPLv3'ed software, certain beneficial deals
between corporations may be hindered, and legal access to third-party
content may diminish. While this may be a negative outcome in the short
term, ultimately GPLv3's anti-DRM Section could push certain industries
79. Indeed, Eblen Moglen concedes that the two licenses will likely coexist for some
time. Tom Sanders, GPL Licenses Will Co-Exist, Says Author, IT WEEK, Aug. 17, 2006, http:I/
www.itweek.co.uk/vnunet/news/2162457/future-holds-dual-gpl-licences.
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to better solutions that address both their own and consumers' needs
more effectively. Nonetheless, companies electing to use GPLv3'ed
FOSS may still face litigation, whether they comply with GPLv3 or not.
The next section addresses the possible outcomes of that litigation.
5. Legal Implications of GPLv3's Anti-DRM Section
GPLv3's DRM provisions will likely have the effect of helping re-
solve some outstanding questions surrounding the GPL and DMCA. The
DMCA is a relatively recent enactment, and though it has been litigated
to some extent, many outstanding legal issues remain.8° For instance, US
courts have adjudicated on when persons or entities violate the DMCA's
prohibition against manufacturing or distributing devices that allow oth-
ers to circumvent technological measures that control access to and
copying of programs." They have also determined when circumventing
technological measures that control access to programs in itself violates
the DMCA.82
Courts have not, however, explicitly addressed whether a copyright
owner can be effectively forced to waive the DMCA's protections, or if
such an imposed waiver is even valid. 3 This scenario is precisely what is
at issue with GPLv3's new anti-DRM provision. Arguably one of DMCA
Section 120 l's six exceptions covers some of what GPLv3 imposes upon
copyright holders of GPLv3'ed software anyways, i.e., the exception for
reverse engineering.84 Even this exception, however, is a stretch. It allows
users who have obtained a valid copy of a computer program to circum-
vent technological restrictions if they need to do so in order to achieve
interoperability with other programs.85 The exception says nothing, how-
ever, of forcing copyright holders to provide the encryption keys, or
"Installation Information," to users. Furthermore, GPLv3 issues a blan-
ket waiver of DMCA protections; it does not limit its scope to situations
in which the user is attempting to circumvent the DRM in order to
achieve interoperability. Inevitably the issue would need to be litigated.
80. See generally Amy P. Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 179 A.L.R. FED. 319 (2002).
81. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
82. See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F Supp. 2d 1085
(N.D. Cal. 2004).
83. See Bunk, supra note 80.
84. See id. § 12.7.
85. Id.
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Related to this, the GPL has rarely been directly litigated,86 at least in
the United States,8 and thus its legal nature remains uncertain in many
respects. Some, for instance, have questioned whether the GPL is even
enforceable;8 8 whether it is a binding contract or simply an effective
means for a copyright owner to estopp herself from asserting her copy-
right; 9 whether it violates the US Constitution, federal copyright law, the
DMCA, export control laws, and antitrust laws;90 whether it fails under
the Uniform Commercial Code; and what the scope of derivative works
under the GPL is.9' These represent a sampling of some of the main legal
issues commentators have debated regarding the GPL. But because the
GPL has never been directly litigated in the US, 9' these debates have re-
mained largely theoretical in nature.
The answers to these questions are important. For instance, if the
GPL is simply a noncontractual release of rights rather than a contract,
some Supreme Court and other precedents firmly reject the enforceabil-
ity of such non-contractual releases in certain contexts. 9' Furthermore,
whether the GPL is a contract or not also affects the remedies a litigant
might have. If it is a contract, the litigant could resort to state law,
86. The Software Freedom Law Center has recently pursued copyright infringement
litigation in U.S. courts based on violations of the GPL, but in each case the parties settled
these suits before any court could adjudicate on the GPL's provisions. See Software Freedom
Law Center, BusyBox Developers Agree to End GPL Lawsuit Against Verizon, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/news/20O8/mar/ I 7lbusybox-verizonl. Other related stories
are within the SFLC site surrounding the series of suits initiated and ultimately settled.
87. In Germany and Austria, parties have directly litigated the validity of the GPL and
came away with rulings that the GPL is enforceable. See, e.g., Landgericht Muinchen I [LG]
[Munich District Court I], May 19, 2004, No. 21 0 6123/04, translated in http://
www.jbb.de/judgmen tdc-munichgpl.pdf (upholding a preliminary injunction enforcing the
GPL). In one U.S. case, both parties accepted the validity of the GPL as a contract, although
the issue was not directly litigated. Progress Software Corp. v. MySQL AB, 195 F Supp. 2d
328 (D. Mass. 2002). See also First Amended Complaint of Plaintiff at 8, MontaVista Soft-
ware, Inc. v. Lineo, Inc., No. 2-02 CV-00309J (D. Utah Jul. 23, 2002) (alleging that Defendant
accepted GPL's validity).
88. SCO's Amended Answer to IBM's Amended Counterclaim at 16, The SCO Group,
Inc. v. IBM, No. 03-CV-0294 (D. Utah Mar. 6, 2003).
89. Jason B. Wacha, Taking the Case: Is the GPL Enforceable?, 21 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 451,455-56 (2005).
90. Id. at 455-75.
91. Under the GPLv3, modifications to the original software program are no longer
labeled "derivative works." The authors of GPLv3 altered this terminology to reflect the li-
cense's more international focus. "Derivative works" is a term of art within US copyright law.
See Douglas Hass, A Gentlemen's Agreement: Assessing the GNU General Public License and
Its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213 (2007), available at
http://ssm.conabstract=951842.
92. See supra note 86.
93. See generally Wacha, supra note 89.
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whereas if the GPL is not a contract, the litigant would have to rely
solely on federal copyright law.94
The GPLv3's anti-DRM provisions could also help resolve certain
outstanding legal issues. Specifically, the explicit renunciation of the
DMCA and other similar acts will undoubtedly trigger DMCA-related
litigation and thus greater exploration of the DMCA's provisions. More
generally, in settling such disputes, courts may also be forced to explore
the nature of the GPL as a legal tool. Many debates about the GPL lin-
ger, especially in the US, so the anti-DRM provisions will likely have
the consequence of forcing courts to address them head on.95
B. Software Patents and GPLv3 's Response
1. Introduction
Software patents have been controversial in the US since the US
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began granting them and federal
courts began legitimizing them.96 Initially, US courts struck down the
idea of software being patentable because software is expressed as algo-
rithms and mathematical formulas, and such abstract ideas typically fall
outside the realm of patentable subject matter.97 Courts have since held,
however, that software is sometimes patentable because algorithms taken
together can constitute an innovative process for accomplishing a desired
end, thus outlining which "ideas" and processes are patentable. 98 Other
regions of the world continue to grapple with whether to include soft-
ware within the scope of patent law.99
This issue is of keen interest to the FOSS movement. Conceivably,
software patent holders could increasingly thwart the liberal licensing
94. Id. at 462-63.
95. One recent author hardly sees this as a benefit, preferring that the open source
community resolve these issues. See Hass, supra note 91, at 278-79. However, these questions
are ultimately legal questions that courts must interpret; no amount of legal drafting would be
able to fully address them. Indeed, the FSF explicitly claims in the GPL that the license is not
a contract, and even with this express clause the question has remained open. Free Software
Foundation, The GPL tested in US courts-Wallace Vs FSF, http://www.fsf.org/news/wallace-
vs-fsf (last visited Apr. 2, 2008) (quoting Peter Brown, the executive Director of the FSF as
saying "[tihe GPL is a software license, it is not a contract.").
96. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding for the first time that an oth-
erwise patentable invention does not become unpatentable simply because it utilizes software).
97. See Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open
Source Movement, 13 Tx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 177-79 (2005) (discussing case law in this
area).
98. Id. at 178-79 (discussing subsequent cases); see, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526,
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
99. See, for example, No Software Patents!, http://www.nosoftwarepatents.com (last
visited Feb. 19, 2008), a site organized to oppose the grant of software patents in the European
Union (EU).
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terms of FOSS licenses, which find their basis in copyright law, by as-
serting their exclusive patent rights against FOSS developers and
distributors. One group that sells FOSS insurance alleges that Linux may
violate 283 patents."'° Furthermore, FOSS supporters have worried at
various times about rumors that Microsoft plans to initiate large-scale
patent infringement suits against FOSS developers and distributors in an
attempt to cripple the FOSS movement.' °' Microsoft's recent deal with
Novell,' °2 described in greater detail below, may lend some credibility to
this fear.
Until now, however, the possible infringement suit nightmare has
failed to materialize. Some companies have taken steps to ensure that it
never does. IBM, for instance, has contributed 500 of its patents to a pat-
ent "commons" to ensure that FOSS developers can use those patented
ideas in their work,' 3 and other companies have taken similar steps."'"
The Open Source Development Labs has also created the patents com-
mons project,' 5 while IBM, Novell, Red Hat, Phillips, and Sony have
created the Open Invention Network in an effort to enable FOSS devel-
opment. ' 6 Nonetheless, many of these same companies continue to
acquire software patents at extremely high rates,'0 7 and while some may
be committed to allowing FOSS companies and developers to use their
patented technologies in FOSS development, other owners of enormous
patent portfolios, such as Microsoft, may be less hesitant to press suit.
Both camps in the FOSS movement believe, to varying degrees, that
software patents often stifle rather than encourage innovation, and that
copyright protection should be sufficient in the software industry, as de-
scribed more fully below. While software patents have yet to have the
100. Stephen Shankland, Group: Linux Potentially Infringes 283 Patents, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. I, 2004, http://www.news.com2100-7344_3-5291403.html.
101. See Stephen Shankland, HP Memo: Microsoft Planned Open-Source Patent Fight,
CNET NEWS.COM, July 20, 2004, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-5276901 .html.
102. See Press Release, Novell, Microsoft and Novell Announce Broad Collaboration on
Windows and Linux Interoperability and Support, Nov. 2, 2006, http://www.novell.com/news/
press/item.jsp?id=l 196.
103. Stephen Shankland, IBM Offers 500 Patents for Open-Source Use, CNET
NEws.coM, Jan. 10, 2005, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-5524680.html.
104. Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Honchos Trash Software Patents, CNET
NEWS.COM, Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-5559647.htm (noting IBM's
contribution, as well as Sun's intention to free up 1,600 of its patents for FOSS development).
105. Ingrid Marson, A Patent Commons Project for Open Source, CNET NEWS.COM,
Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-5826752.html.
106. Press Release, Open Invention Network, Open Invention Network Formed to Pro-
mote Linux and Spur Innovation Globally Through Access to Key Patents, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://openinventionnetwork.com/pressreleasel I1_05.php.
107. See, e.g., Press Release, IFI Patent Intelligence, IFI Issues List of 2005's Top Patent
Companies, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.ificlaims.com/press-release0l2006a.html (showing that
IBM and iP continue to be within the top three in terms of acquiring patents).
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stifling effect on FOSS development that some have feared, their in-
creasing prevalence, combined with changed corporate attitudes, could
yield less favorable outcomes in the future.
Rather than rely on continued corporate goodwill, the FSF has taken
steps of its own in GPLv3 to address this growing software patents
"problem." The license thus includes a new section titled "Patents," as
well as several other provisions that affect software patents. These new
provisions, like the Anti-DRM Section, have significant implications for
developers and users of software licensed under GPLv3. While the pro-
visions will likely contribute to some amount of balkanization in the
FOSS world, the steps the patent provisions take towards addressing the
growing software patents problem seem worth this risk.
2. GPLv3's Patent Provisions
GPLv2 purportedly includes an implicit software patent license, as
well as the "Liberty or Death" clause that essentially disallows distribu-
tion of GPL'ed software if the distributor cannot do so without violating
the GPL.'09 But GPLv3 goes a step further by making its intentions re-
garding software patents more explicit and thorough.
The first two paragraphs of the Patent Section provide two defini-
tions for "contributor" and the contributor's "essential patent claims" in
order to set up the third paragraph's grant of a patent license from each
contributor to each downstream user."0 "Contributor" is defined as a
"copyright holder who authorizes use under this License of the Program
or a work on which the Program is based.""' The work thus licensed is
defined as the "contributor's version. ' 2 "Essential patent claims" are
defined to include any patent claims the contributor may have now or
later that could be infringed through validly exercising rights under
GPLv3, with one exclusion: claims infringed only as a consequence "of
further modification" of the contributor's licensed work are not included
in the definition.
' 3
Under paragraph 3, anyone who authorizes use of a work under
GPLv3 (i.e., any contributor and their contributor version) grants all
eventual recipients of the work a patent license (which incorporates their
108. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION EUROPE, PATENTS AND GPLv3 8 (2006), available
at http://www.fsfeurope.org/projects/gplv3/patents-and-gplv3.en.pdf.
109. Id. at I1. The FSF has edited this clause in GPLv3, but its basic meaning remains
unchanged. It is found in section 12, titled "No Surrender of Others' Freedom." GPLv3, supra
note 10, § 12.
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essential patent claims) to "make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and
otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of their licensed
work." Consequently, the contributor grants this patent license with re-
gards only to its contributor version (i.e., software that the contributor
modifies and distributes), not to software it distributes without modifica-
tion.' The patent license, however, applies to the entire distribution if
any part of it was modified, not just the contributor's contribution."5
However, even those who distribute GPLv3'ed software without
modification can be subject to GPLv3's discipline for bringing a patent
suit: Sections 8 and 10 team up to terminate an entity's permission to use
the work if the entity asserts a patent suit claiming that use of the work,
or any upstream GPLv3'ed work upon which it is based, infringes their
patent portfolio. If the distributor stops distributing and using the work,
however, she can escape these sections' terminating effects." 1
6
a. The Microsoft Effect
The Patent Section's most conspicuous language aims squarely at
Microsoft. During GPLv3's drafting process, the software giant and
Novell, a distributor of SUSE Linux, entered an agreement on November
2, 2006 that, among other things, swapped Microsoft certificates con-
taining promises to Novell customers not to bring patent infringement
suits against them in exchange for money from Novell. ' 7 The agreement
called for other forms of collaboration between the two companies as
well, but this aspect of the agreement in particular drew the immediate
censure of the FSF and others in the FOSS community.
' 8
Once the two companies entered the agreement, the FSF modified
GPLv3's patent provisions in an attempt to make the deal harmless and
similar agreements in the future impossible. After several drafts,
GPLv3's terms vis-A-vis the Microsoft-Novell deal finally emerged.
Paragraph 4 of Section 11 provides a definition of "patent license" to
specifically cover the type of deal Microsoft and Novell struck," 9 and is
thus not "meant to be confined to agreements formally identified or clas-
sified as patent licenses."'2 Paragraph 6 then attacks the deal head on,
indicating that when a company "conveys, or propagates by procuring
114. Stephen Shankland, New GPL Draft Has Olive Branches, Thorns, CNET
NEWS.COM, Mar. 29, 2007, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-6171539.html.
115. Free Software Foundation, supra note 48, at 17-18.
116. Id.
117. Novell, supra note 102.
118. Bruce Byfield, Novell-Microsoft Agreement Delays GPLv3, LINUX.COM, Mar. 15,
2007, http://www.linux.com/feature/60872.
119. GPLv3, supra note 10, § 11.
120. Free Software Foundation, supra note 48, at 21.
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conveyance" of a GPLv3'ed work, and thereby grants a patent license to
another company (e.g., Microsoft's license to Novell and some of its
customers), it automatically grants the same license to all other parties
which receive the covered work from that other party (i.e., recipients of
Novell distributions, even if they do not have Microsoft coupons).' 2'
If effective, GPLv3 may thus render the Microsoft-Novell deal
harmless because all recipients of Novell distributions would have the
same protections, whether paying Microsoft or not. Of course, this result
depends on whether Novell distributes GPLv3-covered works with its
Linux distributions, which it has indicated it will do.' 22 If it does so, the
FSF claims that Microsoft would be propagating by "procuring convey-
ance" of a covered work, and would thus be subject to GPLv3's terms. 23
Microsoft, of course, disputes that it is party to GPLv3.'
21
Paragraph 7 attacks similar deals in the future. It defines patent li-
censes as "discriminatory" essentially when they mirror the Microsoft-
Novell arrangement. "A patent license is 'discriminatory' if it does not
include within the scope of its coverage, prohibits the exercise of, or is
conditioned on the non-exercise of one or more of the rights that are spe-
cifically granted under this License"'025 Paragraph 7 then indicates that a
party may not convey covered works if the party enters an arrangement
with a third party under which the party gives the third party money in
exchange for a discriminatory patent license granted to recipients of cov-
ered works from the party. 26 These provisions would prohibit Novell
from distributing GPLv3'ed works. Paragraph 7, however, only applies
to agreements entered after March 28, 2007, thus excluding the recent
Microsoft-Novell deal.' 27 Previous drafts had applied paragraph 7's con-
tents to all deals; however, given that the FSF believes that paragraph 6
binds Microsoft, the FSF likely feels that allowing Novell to continue to
convey Linux distributions is more tactically sound.'
28
The Patent Section's paragraph 5 also attacks exclusive deals be-
tween distributors and third parties. It requires any conveyor of a
GPLv3'ed work who knowingly relies on a patent license, and where the
"Corresponding Source of the work is not available for anyone to copy,
121. GPLv3, supra note 10, § 11.
122. Press Release, Novell, Novell Statement on Microsoft GPLv3 Position, July 6,
2007, http://www.novell.com/prblogs/?p=365.
123. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, GPLv3 FINAL DISCUSSION DRAFT RATIONALE 10
(2007), available at http://gplv3.fsf.org/rationale/gpl3-dd4-rationale.pdf.
124. Stephen Shankland, Microsoft Tries Evading New GPL Grasp, CNET NEWS.COM,
July 6, 2007, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-6195278.html.
125. GPLv3, supra note 10, § 11.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION, supra note 123.
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free of charge and under the terms of [GPLv3], through a publicly avail-
able network server or other readily accessible means," to either "1)
cause the Corresponding Source to be so available, or 2) arrange to de-
prive yourself of the benefit of the patent license for this particular work,
or 3) arrange, in a manner consistent with the requirements of [GPLv3],
to extend the patent license to downstream users.' ' 129 The paragraph con-
cludes by precisely defining when an entity "knowingly relies" upon a
patent license.IO
The Patent Section concludes by indicating that the section's provi-
sions do not have the effect of limiting or terminating any other patent
infringement defenses a user may have, such as implied license de-
fenses.'3 Hence, though the terms of GPLv3 should be enough, the
license expressly reserves the right of users to assert other defenses oth-
erwise available to the user.
3. FSF's Position: A Step in the Right Direction
Throughout the public debates surrounding these provisions and
• 32
software patents in general, the FSF was unbending. According to an
affiliated group, because software is expressed as algorithms and
mathematical formulas, it falls outside the scope of patentable subject
matter in the first place.' 33 Furthermore, software patents kill innovation
because patent holders can prevent potential innovators from taking a
"bad" product and improving it.' 34 Patent law grants patent holders the
ability to prohibit subsequent developers from "practicing the teaching,"
independent reinvention, or any use of the idea, no matter how the de-
veloper discovered it.' 35 This system of closed standards is antithetical to
the FSF's vision for free software, which focuses on open standards and
the group's four freedoms.'
36
What makes this problem even more egregious is the US govern-
ment's haphazard mode of issuing software patents. Understaffed and
underqualified, the USPTO often issues software patents recklessly and
129. GPLv3, supra note 10, § 11.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Martin LaMonica, Stallman Unbending on Software Patents, CNET NEWS.COM,
Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.news.com2100-7344_3-6027764.html (quoting Richard Stallman
as indicating that, even early on in the process, the FSF would likely not change its position on
software patents). The FSF did make some concessions later in the drafting process. See Free
Software Foundation, supra note 115, at 17-18.
133. Jim Garrison, SFLC Argues Against Software Patents in the Supreme Court,
LWN.NET, Dec. 15, 2006, http://lwn.net/Articles/21442 l/.
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too broadly. 37 Consequently, software ideas in circulation and in use for
some time have suddenly become subject to patent suits. 38
Some of these complaints about patent law's overreach, of course,
are not unique to the software patent realm. But in the FOSS context,
patent law may be an even poorer fit for innovation because many FOSS
developers are not in the financial position to pay for patent licenses,'39
which the FSF describes as a "legal fiction.' ' ° Independent developers
contribute much of the innovation in the FOSS world, and if they were
subject to constant patent infringement suits, presumably such suits
could significantly curtail their innovative efforts.
Even if they could pay for the patent licenses, the larger problem for
FOSS users remains uncertainty. According to Moglen, in the software
context, discovering how many software patents one is infringing is
nearly impossible.' 4' Unlike a physical invention such as a "spinning
wheel," where an inventor need only check a limited number of patents
before proceeding, software inventions require the inventor to check
considerably more patents, and even after doing so she still likely faces
uncertainty as to whether she is violating a software patent.'
42
Hence, Moglen and the FSF describe GPLv3's patent provisions as a
"starting point" for how the free software movement should address the
problem of software patents.' 3 As written, GPLv3 helps prevent software
patent holders from encroaching upon the freedoms distributors and de-
velopers should enjoy with free software. In the end, however, the group
would like to see the total abolition of software patents and recently
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court arguing for as much.'"
4. OSI: Same Side of the Coin?
The OSI has not adopted an official position on software patents or
GPLv3's response to them, and persons typically associated with the




140. Free Software Foundation, Opinion on Covenant Not to Assert Patent Claims 1,
http://gplv3.fsf.org/covenant-not-to-assert-dd2.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
141. Ingrid Marson, Free Software's White Knight, ZDNET NEWS, Mar. 20, 2006,
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-6051589.html.
142. Id.
143. Mark Baard, New GPL Is Free at Last, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 16, 2006, http:/I
www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006101/70028.
144. Brief of the Software Freedom Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), available at
http://www.softwarefreedom.org/resources/2006/msvatt.pdf. The group that submitted the
brief is actually the Software Freedom Law Center, which is closely associated with FSF and
run by Eben Moglen, formerly FSF's leading lawyer.
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less, while their responses have been less absolute than those of the FSF,
former and current leaders of the OSI philosophy point out many of the
same problems with the software patent system that their FSF brethren
do. Furthermore, OSI-approved FOSS licenses contain provisions
somewhat similar to those of GPLv3 (at least earlier drafts), suggesting
some amount of uniformity in how the groups believe software patents
should be addressed.
For instance, Bruce Perens, creator of the OSD and co-founder of
the OSI,' 45 believes that software patents are problematic for many of the
same reasons the FSF does. Due to lack of expertise, the USPTO often
issues software patents using extremely low standards, and this results in
patent holders with overly broad claims who can conceivably block sub-
sequent developers with better ideas from using these patented ideas.
' 46
Furthermore, software stacks, crucial in terms of interoperability, are
based upon standards that become adopted over time, and software pat-
ents in some cases threaten to cut off access to such stacks. 4 7 If someone
owns a patent on technology that has become a standard in a software
stack, that patent holder can extract huge rents through infringement
suits from anyone who uses the software stack.'4 8 While large companies
with extensive patent portfolios can defensively preempt such suits,
small businesses and independent FOSS developers are left exposed to
them.' 4 9 And because many FOSS developers and distributors cannot
pass on the royalty fees to customers (because they often work on a non-
profit basis), they are essentially left without access to the essential
software stacks, which are vital for interoperability purposes.50
Rather than openly advocate the abolition of software patents, how-
ever, Perens instead proposes legislative corrective action that recognizes
the need for interoperability in the online world as well as models that
standards-setting organizations should follow.'5 ' Nonetheless, his ap-
proach recognizes many of the same problems that the FSF does, and his
recommendations align with many of the objectives the FSF endorses.
145. In recent years, however, Perens has seemingly fallen out of favor with the OSI.
See, e.g., David Berlind, OSI Committee Rejects Former Founder Bruce Peren's Membership
Application, ZDNET NEWS, Aug. 22, 2005, http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTU?p= 1763.
146. See Bruce Perens, The Problem of Software Patents in Standards, http:II
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Lawrence Rosen, former counsel to the OSI, similarly believes that
software patents are problematic'52 and has taken measures to combat
their possibly deleterious effects. For instance, he and the OSI have pro-
moted new open source licenses that include patent retaliation provisions
similar to those found in earlier drafts of GPLv3. 53 These provisions,
found most notably in the Open Software License and the Academic
Free License (both of which Rosen wrote), provide users and developers
of FOSS with a similar defense against patent suits.1
Eric Raymond, another prominent figure in the OSI community, also
cites many of the same problems his colleagues do, including standards
for patentability that are too low and underqualified patent examiners
with the wrong mix of incentives.' He also believes that any software
created as open source should be considered prior art in any effective
software patent system.'
Nonetheless, not all members of the OSI-leaning community appear
ready to call for a complete prohibition on software patents, as leaders of
the FSF do. As Raymond further states, "I think I can imagine a software
patent system that was [sic] fair and equitable .... [T]here are some
software patents which I think are certainly legitimate . . . .""' While he
views software patents as "annoying," it is a problem that will take care
of itself if FOSS advocates do their job effectively, i.e., demonstrate to
the business world the advantages of using FOSS over closed systems. '8
This less absolute stance of Raymond and others'" seems to be part
of the same pragmatism that the OSI has officially advocated since 1998.
As noted earlier, commercial enterprises remain committed to prosecut-
ing and obtaining software patents and believe doing so is crucial to their
commercial well-being, at least so long as other competitors continue to
acquire their own patent portfolios.' 60 Hewlett-Packard, for one, sug-
152. Robert McMillan, Patent War Pending? Lawrence Rosen on How Open Source Can









159. A group of ten of the more prominent Linux kernel developers published a position
paper in September 2006 condemning GPLv3 generally (then in its second draft) and in par-
ticular the patent provisions, citing them as a possible invasion of a company's prerogatives
and representing a possible chilling effect on the corporate input needed in FOSS develop-
ment. JAMES E.J. BOTTOMLEY ET AL., THE DANGERS AND PROBLEMS WITH GPLv3 (2006),
available at http://Iwn.net/images/pdf/kernelgplv3-position.pdf.
160. Stephen Shankland, HP Balks at Patent Provision in GPL Update, CNET
NEWS.COM, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.news.com/2100-7344_3-610138 !.html.
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gested alternative language earlier in the GPLv3 revision process out of
fear that the earlier form of the patent section could unwittingly invali-
date much of its patent portfolio.' 6' Others, including key Linux
developers, have expressed similar fears.
62
Subsequently, the FSF altered GPLv3's patent provisions so that dis-
tributors without modification escape Section I l's grasp (providing an
automatic patent license to all downstream users for whatever patents
read onto the distribution). However, as discussed below, they still re-
main subject to Sections 8 and 10's effects if they bring a patent
infringement suit against someone for exercising their rights under
GPLv3; thereby, their permission to use and distribute the work is termi-
nated.
Despite these changes, however, commercial actors' fears may still
have some substance. The next section explores what the patent provi-
sions may ultimately mean for FOSS development.
5. Patent Provisions' Possible Effects
Many of the patent provisions' possible effects deal with similar is-
sues to those that the Anti-DRM Section raised. For instance, if a
company contributes to and then conveys a GPLv3'ed software program
containing certain technologies for which it owns software patents, the
company could not press a patent infringement suit against a different
party for using the GPLv3'ed software program, even if the company
was not the entity that inserted the technologies into the software pro-
gram (and even if a legitimate patent infringement case could be
made).163 In the end, some software patents probably do act as important
incentives to companies and in fact do spur rather than thwart innova-
tion.' 64 Merely conveying FOSS could have disastrous results for a
company in terms of protecting its patent portfolio. The safest option for
many companies may be to avoid GPLv3 altogether.
161. Id.
162. See BOTTOMLEY ET AL., supra note 159, at 4.
163. See Shankland, supra note 160.
164. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BAL-
ANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 3, at 44-52 (Oct. 2003), available
at www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting that, although many indicators suggest
that software patents in current form stifle rather than encourage innovation, some patents may
actually have positive effects). But see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Designing Optimal
Software Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY (Robert Hahn, ed. 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=692044
(accepting "as given the proposition that patent law has a positive role to play in fostering
software innovation," but dedicating the chapter to showing why the current system is less
than ideal in promoting that innovation).
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Consequently, a company's fear of involuntarily invalidating sig-
nificant parts of its patent portfolio could cause large segments of the
corporate world to shun GPLv3, and thereby lead to parallel universes
of GPLv2 and GPLv3. While GPLv3's dream may be to reduce overall
license proliferation by making GPLv3 so attractive that FOSS devel-
opers abandon other licenses in favor of it, it may instead increase
license proliferation and further splinter the FOSS movement to an ex-
tent that significantly harms FOSS development.
This is a major concern of a group of prominent Linux kernel de-
velopers, who refer to this phenomenon as the FOSS world's
"balkanization."' 65 They prefer the well-developed GPLv2 "ecosystem"
where Linux distributors can assemble an entire distribution out of
GPLv2'ed components.'" With GPLv3's patent provisions, corpora-
tions unwilling to risk their patent portfolios may cut off their input
and contributions, and distributions will be forced to "fork" software
packages in order to maintain consistent and acceptable licensing
schemes.' 67 These developers fear that such a development could seri-
ously hamper FOSS development.
68
Nonetheless, while some amount of license proliferation and bal-
kanization may inevitably occur, for many of the same reasons
discussed above, it is unlikely that GPLv3 will have the deleterious
effects to the extent some fear. Indeed, despite some of the corporate
world's reservations, major players in that world had significant input
into the license, and thus already have some amount of buy-in. Many
important projects have already converted over to GPLv3.' 69 As other
major players become familiar with the license-indeed, are forced to
do so as the license gains increasing currency-acceptance of its use in
the commercial context will likely increase, especially given the strate-
gic advantages FOSS projects provide many commercial actors.
Furthermore, for those projects that cannot stomach GPLv3's pat-
ent terms, GPLv2's less explicit patent terms may remain an option in
some cases. While some slowing of FOSS development may initially
occur, ultimately the movement will likely overcome these speed
bumps as familiarity with and acceptance of the newer license in-
creases.




169. See Palamida, GPLv3 and LGPLv3 Information Site, http://gpl3.palamida.com:8080/
index.jsp (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (indicating that as of February 20, 2008, 1744 projects
had switched over to GPLv3, including important ones such as Samba).
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Furthermore, though these provisions may complicate FOSS de-
velopment in less than ideal ways, arguably GPLv3's patent provisions
help alter the balance of power among software companies in a good
way. For instance, owners of large software patent portfolios often use
their patents to cross-license with other companies with large portfolios
or to use them defensively, i.e., to deter suit against themselves through
the threat of a countersuit. 170 While companies with large, significant
patent portfolios are relatively well-off in this system, smaller entities
are not as favorably positioned. Indeed, large owners of patents can use
their patent leverage to force smaller companies into deals that favor
the larger entities. 
7
'
In addition, the current software patent system arguably encour-
ages companies to incur significant-and, in some sense, wasteful-
costs in prosecuting software patents, when those resources could be
more usefully employed, from a societal perspective, in software re-
search and development. 72 From a policy perspective, then, the
GPLv3's patent provisions could push companies to greater innovation
rather than wasteful defensive patent buildup.
In conclusion, the more important effect of these provisions could
be to shield independent, smaller developers from possible suits and
unequal bargaining positions. They may help even the playing field for
these smaller entities effectively deal with the leverage of larger com-
panies, at least in terms of software patents. The provisions also
arguably encourage more FOSS development, and could help eliminate
the wasted costs associated with companies engaging in software pat-
ent games. While waiting upon legislative and judicial action to more
effectively address the software patent problem may be the more "de-
mocratic" thing to do, GPLv3's patent terms represent one potentially
useful measure in dealing with the problem and in helping shape any
subsequent legislative debates.
Nonetheless, the provisions could slow FOSS collaboration in
some cases (especially if the Linux kernel truly does remain under
GPLv2) through forking of projects, and diminish some amount of
170. See generally James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Tech-
nologies (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/
thicket.pdf (describing patent thickets and companies strategic rather than innovation-based
incentives for acquiring software patents). See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note
164, ch. 2, at 33-34.
171. Bessen, supra note 170, at 4.
172. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents (Research on
Innovation, Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/
swpat.pdf (empirically demonstrating that software patent acquisition is associated with lower
levels of R&D investments, presumably because companies are more concerned with the stra-
tegic use of patents than the innovation incentives).
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corporate involvement as companies seek to avoid invalidating large
swaths of their patent portfolios. As more and more FOSS projects fall
within GPLv3's terms, however, companies will likely learn to deal
with the license's terms rather than abandon the strategic advantages of
FOSS altogether. The new license certainly changes and complicates
the legal background in which these commercial actors will operate,
but from a policy perspective, it is an arguably positive change.
6. Legal Implications of GPLv3's Patent Provisions
Like the Anti-DRM Section, the patent provisions could also help
settle the questions of whether the GPL is enforceable, whether it is a
contract or merely a non-contractual release of rights, and the other
related questions discussed previously above. In the US, until this
point, most compliance with the GPL's terms has been voluntary and
through the assistance and encouragement of FOSS watchdog
groups."' But if Microsoft, for instance, ultimately does elect to bring
large-scale patent infringement suits against the FOSS world, such
suits would inevitably involve the questions of whether the GPL is en-
forceable as a contract or otherwise, and specifically its patent sections.
Indeed, whether a legal tool such as GPLv3 can and should be allowed
to effectively preempt federal patent law is uncertain.
Of course, GPLv3's patent provisions may be less than ideal pre-
cisely because they may encourage suits that otherwise would not
occur. Until now, rumors about Microsoft's threats have remained ru-
mors, and the company has apparently lacked enough strategic reasons
to press suits in the past. With GPLv3 taking the offensive and effec-
tively invalidating large swaths of software patents, possibly including
some of Microsoft's, should the company convey GPLv3'ed software
(which the FSF and GPLv3 claim Microsoft has done through its re-
cent deal with Novell), it and other companies may now have the right
mix of incentives to press such suits.
Furthermore, Microsoft may have additional incentives to sue
given its recent deal with Novell. 74 Microsoft argues that the patent
claims Novell is shielding its clients from pertain to Linux. 7 1 If
GPLv3's patent provisions are valid, they would essentially turn
173. See, e.g., Bruce Byfield, 10 Common Misunderstandings About the GPL, IT
MANAGER'S J., Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.thewebcreator.net/2007/04/19/10-common-
misunderstandings-about-the-gpl (last visited Mar. 4, 2008) (noting that the FSF prefers help-
ing violators of the GPL come into compliance rather than resorting to the courts).
174. Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols, Novell-Microsoft Patent Deal Secrets, May 28, 2007,
Linux-Watch.com, http://www.linux-watch.com/news/NS8399443208.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2008).
175. Id.
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Microsoft's deal with Novell "on its head" because everyone would
have the same guarantee of non-suit without having to pay Microsoft
off. 17 6 If Microsoft hopes to sign and maintain similar deals with other
Linux distributors and FOSS developers, 77 it will first want to ensure
that its patents are enforceable, and that GPLv3 terms do not apply. For
its part, Microsoft claims it is not a contracting party to GPLv3; the
FSF obviously believes otherwise.
78
Thus, GPLv3's patent provisions will almost certainly push fester-
ing legal disputes, which may have otherwise remained dormant, out
into the open. While such suits may initially slow and complicate
FOSS development, ultimately they should help settle outstanding legal
questions in the FOSS movement's favor, both in terms of the license's
patent provisions as well as the legal nature of the GPL generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
GPLv3 was controversial in its drafting and will likely remain so in
its adoption. Two of its more controversial components, the Anti-DRM
Section and the patent provisions, have inspired some of the more
heated debates, both within the FOSS world and without. Unanimity on
these issues is unlikely to develop anytime soon.
But though GPLv3 may lead to some amount of balkanization and
license proliferation in the FOSS world, it will also likely ultimately
lead to the community's strengthening. In recent years, DRM has
gained increasing prevalence and, in many cases, thwarts the goals of
both free software and open source software alike. Furthermore, com-
panies have increasingly acquired software patents as well, thereby
incurring significant costs in patent prosecution to effectively partici-
pate in a patents game that often has very little to do with software
innovation. Some sort of bolstering of FOSS's freedoms was needed in
the face of the threats these developments pose, and reliance on corpo-
rate goodwill was unlikely to be sufficient.
GPLv3 strikes the right balance. In terms of DRM, it keeps FOSS
open for further innovation with few potential costs to those wishing to
implement DRM. Though companies (as well as government regula-
tors) may want to limit the use of their product to versions they have
tested and certified, this concern is easily addressed through a waiver
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or disclaimer. Or, as the case may be, FOSS projects can simply remain
under GPLv2. Unwanted litigation may result concerning the validity
of such waivers, the DMCA, and the GPL itself, but these costs, from a
societal standpoint, seem more palatable than the huge costs that
DRM-locked FOSS could ultimately impose if left unchecked.
And though third-party content owners may require DRM before
entrusting their content with hardware and software manufacturers,
such parties may be left with little choice as the world increasingly
moves away from DRM and towards solutions more satisfactory to
owners and consumers alike. GPLv3 may be one effective means for
pushing industries, at least in certain contexts, away from the largely
acrimonious DRM solution.
In terms of GPLv3's patent provisions, these also represent a par-
tial solution to the increasingly troublesome area of software patents.
Legislative action is slow, cumbersome and, until now, has largely
failed to occur. Furthermore, companies with large financial stakes and
the means to enforce them would likely dominate any significant
changes that were to occur.
In the meantime, GPLv3's patent provisions help shield the FOSS
movement against the increasingly complicated patent games of com-
mercial actors, and thereby ultimately help protect the movement's
innovative path. Though the license's patent terms may lead some cor-
porate sponsors to shun GPLv3, and thereby potentially slow FOSS
development through balkanization, it is unlikely that GPLv3 will re-
main a minority license given the corporate world's input into the
license, the FSF's influence and licensing of their projects under
GPLv3, and FOSS's proven strategic advantages for many companies
including, presumably, many projects under GPLv3.
As GPLv3 works through these growing pains, its benefits should
become more apparent. Indeed, the license's patent provisions should
increasingly push companies towards focusing more of their efforts on
software R&D, and less on pursuing costly software patents for reasons
unrelated to innovation. Furthermore, small companies and independ-
ent developers will likely benefit from GPLv3's patent terms because
the provisions should help level the playing field for those entities vis-
A-vis larger commercial actors. This, too, should lead to greater soft-
ware innovation.
In the end, GPLv3 constitutes license proliferation. Legal compli-
cations will arise, and litigation could become necessary to settle the
many outstanding questions the GPL raises. But these costs seem worth
the possible benefits GPLv3 promises. In one sense, the license cer-
tainly complicates the FOSS world, yet in another it simplifies it by
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dealing with the growing problems of software patents and DRM in
one fell swoop. GPLv3 may not be the ultimate solution, but it is
poised as a step in the right direction.
